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 Democracy, Traditional Leadership and 
the International Economy in South 
Africa  
Abstract 
The paper argues that in order to adequately analyse the development of post-
colonial democracy – in this case South Africa – a theoretical model has to take 
into account the context within which that democratic experiment finds itself in.  
This context is shaped by the international political economy, the circulation of 
a democracy discourse at both the level of global and local political culture, and 
the history of state-formation.  The paper explores what might explain the 
resurgence of purportedly ‘traditional’ modes of governance, symbolised by the 
‘chief’ across several rural landscapes.  It argues that the inability of the state 
to affect fundamental changes in the social, political and economic conditions of 
the rural hinterlands has created a situation in which local power holders are 
able to redefine traditional cultural values.  In the process of doing so, these 
local power holders both shape and are shaped by a global discourse of what 
democracy might be and mean.  The paper highlights the debate concerning 
notions of “African” forms of democracy, embodied most starkly by some of 
Nelson Mandela’s writings, which hold that village level deliberation and 
chieftaincy based upon community consensus may be more appropriate models 
of democracy than western versions based upon the notions of electoral 
contestation.  This argument stands in sharp contrast to conventional 
approaches to democracy which would suggest that traditional leadership is an 
anachronism of lesser developed countries and stands in contrast to western 
democratic norms and values.    
  2
Introduction 
This paper examines the unexpected return to prominence, the re-invention and 
resurgence of traditional leadership structures in some rural parts of South 
Africa.  This despite the commitments to democratic, elected governance 
enshrined in the constitution, adopted and endorsed by all the political parties 
and expressed in all aspects of the political system introduced in 1994.   At both 
the formal and informal level of political action, traditional leadership has 
returned to the centre of rural politics and not just in South Africa but in many 
spaces and places across the post-colony countries.  Reports from Melanesia, 
Polynesia, many parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America, even North America and 
Europe indicate that self-described ‘traditional’ forms of governance are 
successfully resisting attempts to assign them to the archives of the past (White 
and Lindstrom, 1997).  Not only have such forms of governance survived the 
coming of modernity in the sense of democratic governance based on the 
individual franchise, elected representation and accountable governmentality but 
they are also being re-invented in all sorts of hybrid forms to suit their new 
context.  What might explain such an unexpected phenomenon?  Does this re-
emergence indicate a danger for democracy or is it an indication of the 
emergence of local forms of democratic politics?  And is there any possible way 
of reconciling these re-invented, modernised traditions with western notions of 
procedural or substantive democracy? 
Methodology 
To provide an answer to these questions, the paper employs two social science 
methodologies.  The first approach, the dominant approach in the political 
sciences, is one that adopts a procedural and institutional definition of 
democracy.  Some of these analyses attempt to, as far as possible, quantify data 
to ascertain law-like rules and patterns that govern political action and behavior.  
Whether quantitative or not, scholars in this tradition share the underlying 
assumption that ‘democracy’ is a concept of universal meaning and application.  
The concept ‘democracy’ is transhistorical, as the many attempts to link 
Athenian notions of direct democracy with the representative democracies of the 
20
th century illustrate. The concept ‘democracy’ is also transcultural, as shown 
by the endless attempts to illustrate that democracy is, in its essence, the same in 
Japan as it is in Jamaica even if there are institutional differences. These 
transhistorical and transcultural assumptions are then used to justify what 
amounts to an analytical trick in which the analyst uses the democracies of  3
EuroAmerica as an uncritical template in terms of which the newer democracies 
of the post-colony can be studied, classified and often found wanting. 
The second approach rejects the premise that democracy means the same across 
time and space.  The approach examines the conceptual difficulties associated 
with words such as ‘democracy’ and characterises democracy as a social 
imaginary that is in a process of evolution rather than only an institutional 
system with well defined rules, procedures, practices and institutions.  Contrary 
to the first approach, it views democracy as a product of history and culture and 
inseparable from its context, particularly the international economy.  To 
operationalise such an approach requires a close investigation of local political 
praxis as well as the influence of the global economy and local history on that 
praxis. Proponents of this approach argue that the methods of the first school are 
inappropriate for the study of the newer democracies as they ignore the 
historical and cultural differences between the western templates and their post-
colonial counterparts.  Moreover, the international context at the beginning of 
the 21
st century imposes several limits and constraints upon post-colonial 
democracies, which have to be taken into account in a serious attempt to 
understand the dynamics of the formation of democracy in such post-colonial or 
post-apartheid contexts. 
The two social science paradigms lead us to quite divergent responses and 
explanations.  The first approach identifies a variation in the reach of social 
rights, in the words of Guillermo O’Donnell (1993), to suggest that there are 
areas in South Africa where democratic rights are not being respected despite a 
constitution and political system devoted to their implementation.  Adam 
Przeworski and his co-authors (2000) would argue that the re-emergence of 
traditional leaders points to the lack of economic growth and development.   
They would interpret the re-emergence of traditional leadership not only as 
inherently incompatible with democracy but a worrisome indication of 
regression into local forms of dictatorship.  William Munro’s analysis of the 
politics of traditional leadership in KwaZulu-Natal certainly echoes these 
concerns (Monroe, 2001).   My critique of the conventional literature on 
democracy will focus on Munro’s contribution as it represents the mainstream 
approach to the study of democracy in the post-colony by those placed in the 
metropole. 
The second approach illustrates how different political actors use the term 
‘democracy’ to engage in a battle for political power and authority.  This 
approach illustrates how the meaning of the term ‘democracy’ can be put to very  4
different uses and reveals the conceptual difficulties that arise when different 
definitions of what democracy means are at work in the same political space 
(Schaffer, 1998; Chatterjee, 2003; Wedeen, 2004).  The approach examines the 
everyday political practices of South African citizens in those rural parts of the 
country and regions governed by traditional authorities to reveal the complex 
and hybrid nature of traditional leadership, its enormous variations across the 
region, its adaptability and malleability.  It reveals how the lack of an active 
state leaves room for the re-invention of tradition and how the urban political 
elite might find this re-invention suitable to its own political agenda (Koelble 
and LiPuma, 2005).  It also illuminates the way in which traditional leaders are 
forced by circumstance to adapt to a rapidly changing social, economic and 
cultural environment.   All-the-while, they insist that they represent an eternal 
“African way of doing things” that is conceived of as an essential aspect of 
culture when it is anything but that. 
Paper Structure and Research Objectives 
The first part of the paper examines the concept of traditional leadership and 
illustrates both its formal and informal resurgence.  The second section critically 
examines the procedural and institutional approach to democracy favoured by 
the discipline of political science. The approach leads to the conclusion that 
traditional leadership and democratic governance are deeply incompatible 
concepts.  The third section investigates how the term ‘democracy’ is put to 
different uses in the South African political environment. It investigates the 
various conceptualisations of democracy relevant to local political discourses 
and shows how these discourses shape and reshape the concept ‘democracy’.  
This section suggests that concepts are not imbued with a universal essence but 
are malleable and shift forms and shapes; i.e. they are context specific, 
culturally, linguistically and historically determined and therefore do not mean 
the same thing in different places.  The last section illustrates the manner in 
which traditional leadership functions in various parts of South Africa.  The 
intention here is to examine how some traditional leaders are attempting to 
‘democratise’ their role and function in rural society while others wish to re-
establish ‘commandement’ structures of authority and power that replicate 
colonial and apartheid experiences (Mbembe, 2000; Mandami, 1996).   
The aim of this methodological journey is to illustrate that ‘democracy’ in the 
post-colony cannot be divorced from three fundamental factors:  5
1.  The workings of the international economy that undermines the economic 
sovereignty of post-colonial states and forces such new democracies to, 
on the one hand, abandon functions always considered critical to the 
establishment and maintenance of the nation-state while, on the other 
hand, forcing the same state into functions and actions that are not 
associated with the western model of state-building or compatible with 
procedural and substantive notions of democracy;  
2.  The global discourse of what democracy means in terms of political 
practices, institutions, procedures and norms and its local circulation and 
permutations that develop into hybrid arrangements that may differ 
significantly from the original western model; 
3.  The underlying socio-structures left behind by the colonial/apartheid past 
that do not change as rapidly or as easily as the political system might 
such as deep-seated poverty, a culture of violence and retribution, 
HIV/AIDS, unemployment, lack of skills and a myriad of other socio-
cultural dimensions. 
Only if analysis grasps the interactions between the international economy, local 
culture and history will the theory of democracy be adequate to its object of 
study.  Only if democracy is understood to be a social imaginary in motion and 
subject to negotiation rather than only a system of institutions and practices, will 
the analysis of democracy in post-colonial spaces be able to move forward from 
its current state.  The efforts to establish ‘democracy ratings’ in the form of 
Freedom House charts or ‘quality of democracy rankings’ are at best misguided 
and at worst ideologically driven attempts to establish ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
democracies. The argument I wish to make is not that institutions and 
procedures do not matter: they clearly do as so many political science works 
illustrate (Thelen, Steinmo and Longstreth, 1992).  Rather, to ascertain why 
democracy in the post-colony appears to be taking a radically different turn 
compared to its western counterparts, an amended methodology is called for.   
The key point is that the local political culture, the international setting and 
history of the post-colony, in this case South Africa, must be factored into a 
comprehensive analysis of what democracy might mean, might be and currently 
is. 
  6
The Resurgence of Traditional Leadership in 
the Rural Hinterlands of South Africa 
In June 2003, Kaizer Chief Matanzima passed away at the ripe old age of 88.  
Matanzima had been the first premier of the Transkei, the first of the homelands 
fabricated by the apartheid regime in its aborted attempt to give substance to the 
doctrine of separate development.   Matanzima went on to become a key ally of 
the apartheid regime in its effort to establish the Bantu Authorities and the 
various land consolidation and agricultural ‘betterment’ programmes that are 
today seen as a major cause of black impoverishment in the rural areas of South 
Africa.  Matanzima did everything in his power to insure that the Transkei did 
not become a hotbed of political activity during his reign and had a hand in the 
silencing of numerous opponents to the regime.  Moreover, his dealings with 
key industrialists and entrepreneurs, among them Sol Kerzner, the hotel 
magnate, earned him the reputation for being easily corruptible.  In a one-line 
review, this was not a comrade in the struggle against apartheid.  Quite the 
contrary: Matanzima was an important black collaborator in the establishment 
and functioning of apartheid and certainly one of its few black beneficiaries. 
What is remarkable about the Kaizer’s passing away is the politics of events that 
followed his demise.  An  appeal  was made by Chief Mwelo Nonkonyana, 
ANC MP, member of the Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders and 
provincial chairperson of the Congress of Traditional Leaders (Contralesa), to 
the provincial government of the Eastern Cape to provide for a state funeral for 
the King of the Emigrant Thembu.  The then premier of the province, 
Makhenkhezi Stofile, then requested that central government cover the cost for 
the funeral.  There is no doubt that the Matanzima family, which includes 
several highly ranking members of the ANC including Patekile Holomisa, the 
current chairperson of Contralesa and Nelson Mandela, the former President, 
could afford to shoulder the costs of the funeral.  The issue of the state burial 
came up as a result of Matanzima having been a monarch and ‘head of state’.  
And while the status of the Transkei as an independent country was certainly not 
undisputed, he could qualify for a state funeral as a result of the royal position 
he had held for some forty years. 
President Mbeki vetoed the granting of a state funeral.  Yet, the Eastern Cape 
provincial government, itself in receivership as a result of the gross 
mismanagement of funds rooted in the malpractices of the Matanzima regime, 
took it upon itself to provide a portion of the funds for what became a rather 
lavish affair.  But the really surprising development of the funeral was that  7
several eminent statesmen, who had fought against apartheid and everything 
Matanzima stood for, and who had been the architects of the new dispensation, 
hailed the Chief as if he had been a member of the liberation struggle.   
Overturning his own veto, President Mbeki appeared and praised the chief for 
his tireless efforts to provide a better life to his ‘subjects’.  No less a figure than 
Nelson Mandela provided a praise song for the man who had once offered to 
take him into ‘protective care’, noting that Mandela would then no longer serve 
as a threat to the apartheid regime.  The aforementioned MP Nonkonyana even 
referred to the Chief as a ‘liberator of black people’ and a ‘statesman among 
statesmen’.  Given the role Matanzima had in providing some semblance of 
legitimacy to apartheid, these sentiments and statements were the reversal of the 
history unearthed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).  It 
represented the public redemption of a figure that once epitomised the many 
smaller acts of black self-betrayal that wounded the ANC and no doubt retarded 
the overthrow of apartheid.  One observer, voicing the concerns of many, asked 
why the ANC had stooped to the ‘sanctification of an evil man’.  Why had it 
chosen to cauterise the wounds of the past through a publicly orchestrated act of 
forgetting? 
The eulogising of the Chief is only a fractional part of a surprising story about 
the come-back the traditional authorities, so fundamental to the apartheid regime 
and the rural misfortunes of the majority of South African citizens, are making 
(Crais, 2002; Ntsebeza, 1999).   In several parts of the country – mostly in the 
former Bantustans of Venda, Ciskei, Transkei, and Bophuthatswana but also in 
other parts of Limpopo, Mpumalanga, and KwaZulu-Natal provinces – the 
traditional leaders are back in the business of politics.   Armed with the blessing 
of several pieces of local government legislation and in contradistinction to the 
professions of ANC politicians that the tribal authorities were to be a thing of 
the past, traditional leaders are re-inventing themselves and their institution.   
There is a certain irony in the fact that the professed instrument for weakening 
the tribal authorities – the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 and the Municipal 
Systems Act of 1999 – have become instruments for the re-assertion of chiefly 
power.  These acts were to reform local governance across the country by 
instituting elected government across the country.  However, the number of 
municipalities was sharply reduced from 850 to 284 and since the scope of local 
governance in terms of territory to be covered (now local government covers 
those parts of the country formerly excluded under the Bantustan policy), the 
actual reach of local governance is limited (Ntsebeza, 1999; 2002; Claasens, 
2001).  In some cases, the size of the municipalities, as large as mid-sized 
European states, is such that it is difficult to establish meaningful  8
communication channels between councilors and the governed.  Moreover, 
chiefs were provided with 20% of the seats in the municipal government as they 
are, according to the new local government legislation, to be consulted by the 
elected officials on matter pertaining to development.  This form of 
representation goes far beyond the restricted and vague role given to tribal 
authorities in the Constitution.   
In addition, there are several clauses in the Communal Land Rights Act of 2004 
that provide for exceptions to general rules regarding land usage and ownership 
to accommodate areas under tribal or traditional authority.  The legislation 
provides traditional leaders with the right to distribute communal lands and 
determine its usage (Ntsebeza, 2004). Most importantly, the Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Amendment Act of 2003, while bitterly 
criticised by the traditional leaders for being too limiting in its application, 
provides traditional authorities with a role in land administration, health and the 
administration of justice, economic development and arts and culture (Crais, 
2004).   It provides ‘traditional communities’ with limited forms of sovereignty 
and outlines the process for the reworking of traditional rule.  And certainly the 
fact that in a country where the government is reluctant to implement a general 
HIV/AIDS medication strategy due to its costs, the willingness of the state to 
cough up 50 million Rand a month to support an institution long seen as an 
anachronism poses important questions. 
An objection could be mounted that although there might appear to be an 
affirmation in some parts of South Africa of ‘traditional leadership’ structures, 
its nature is so varied across the country and so local and limited that it should 
not detract from the overall consolidation of democracy.  Traditional leaders do 
not exist in urban spaces and there is no House of Traditional Leaders in three of 
the provinces of South Africa – the highly urbanised provinces of Gauteng and 
the Western Cape as well as the rural Northern Cape. Moreover, traditional 
leaders play an important role only in some enclaves across the country, mainly 
those areas which were former Bantustans and in which the apartheid regime 
had installed traditional leaders to do its bidding.  And, indeed it is correct to 
observe that there is enormous variation across South Africa in terms of the 
authority traditional leaders can exert.  Yet, the fact remains that at both the 
formal, institutional level and at the informal, everyday level, traditional leaders 
are re-asserting their power in such rural spaces.   
As LiPuma and Koelble (2005) demonstrate, traditional leaders can do so 
partially because the state is unable to reach into these rural hinterlands.  As one  9
of our interviewees wryly remarked, “when you talk to the chief, something will 
happen; when you talk to the council, you know nothing will happen”. The 
‘failure’ of the state to bring effective local government to these rural 
hinterlands is part of a cascade of limits and constraints placed upon the South 
African state by its external environment.  The South African government is 
highly dependent on the perceptions of the international financial markets 
(Abedian, 2004).  The ten years since 1994 demonstrate that these markets are 
highly sensitive to any signal the ANC government might make that it is to veer 
of the course set by the “Washington Consensus”.  The abrupt devaluation of the 
Rand, despite essentially positive ‘economic fundamentals’, in 1996, 1998 and 
2001 illustrate how dependent the country is on positive sentiments in the 
derivatives and other international financial markets (Roux, 2004; Kantor, 
2004).    
The consequence of any policy decision that might indicate (or even hint) to 
these markets that the South African government might steer away from its 
conservative fiscal and monetary course (or merely the threat of it) is severe 
volatility in the exchange rate of the currency.  As a result of these limits on 
liberation, the South African state has been unable to aggressively address the 
vast social and economic legacies of apartheid, particularly in the rural areas so 
willfully neglected and systematically destroyed by the colonial and apartheid 
regimes.  The failure of the state to touch the lives of rural citizens and the 
concomitant failure of the democratically elected but ineffective local authorities 
has opened up several spaces for traditional leaders to re-affirm their cultural, 
social, economic and ultimately political power in all sorts of manners 
(Claasens, 2001). However, this failure by the state is complemented with a 
reformulation of what traditional leadership structures might look like and how 
they might be made more compatible with an indigenous version of local 
democracy that incorporates “African ways of doing things”.  
Consider the wide variety of adaptations South Africa has so far witnessed from 
its traditional leaders.  There are several instances across the country where 
traditional leaders have been placed on top of the party lists of the ANC and the 
IFP and garnered between 80 and 90% of the rural vote in their districts 
(Koelble, 2004).   They now represent their communities in national or local 
parliament; some are cabinet, others provincial ministers.   One might argue that 
such individuals have ‘integrated’ into the democratic politics of the new South 
Africa.  Yet, the question must be: has the political party gained that many votes 
in an electoral district as a result of a ‘fair and free’ election in the 
EuroAmerican sense or is the election result an indication of a very different 
understanding of the electoral mechanism?  It is, for instance, not uncommon in  10
wide parts of the Pacific, Asia and Africa to vote for a particular person or party 
as a consensus-building exercise rather than an expression of the aggregation of 
individual preferences (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1997; Mbembe, 2000).   
Electoral conflict is to be avoided as it can result in communal conflict and is 
therefore subject to negotiation prior to the election.  And, there is anecdotal 
evidence that indeed these mechanisms are at work in several parts of South 
Africa.  Another question must be whether the individual gained support as a 
result of his being a chief or as a result of his belonging to the appropriate party?  
Several studies in Southern Africa indicate that the chief can play an important 
role in mobilising and persuading citizens to vote for a particular party 
(Ntzebesa, 1999; Oomen and van Kessel, 1997).  Of course, one could take the 
position that it scarcely matters whether chiefs are elected because of their social 
status or party affiliation, as long as they adhere to democratic principles on 
their way to the elected position.  However, it is far from clear whether the 
mechanisms of choice, particularly in the rural areas of the country, conform to 
the ideology of the self-interested voter or the vote-maximising candidate so 
widespread in EuroAmerican political analysis.  
There can be little doubt that some traditional leaders have opted for creative 
adaptations to the new political and economic system and its opportunities.   
There are several instances where traditional leaders have created community 
development trusts or trust funds to administer communal lands.  In such cases, 
the community trust is usually associated with a communal land claim for the 
restitution of land appropriated by the apartheid or colonial regimes (Robins, 
2003).  In such cases, it is often the chief who is also the chief executive officer 
of the fund and his councilors constitute the board of directors (van Wyk, 2003).  
This strategy has raised some eyebrows since it is not at all clear that the CEO of 
the trust is any more accountable and that his actions are any more transparent to 
the community that supposedly benefits from such corporations than the 
shareholders of any corporation.  Finally, and more on this topic in the last 
section of the paper, there are several instances where traditional leaders have 
reformulated the way in which village level decisions are taken to make the 
institution far more ‘democratic’ (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1997).   
The above strategies of adaptation could be considered as creative, adaptive 
responses to the coming of a new dispensation. Other traditional leaders have 
taken openly hostile positions to the new regime, as for instance a group of 
Swazi chiefs in Mpumalanga province.  Robert Thornton illustrates how these 
traditional leaders threatened the South African state with secession to  11
Swaziland, sanctified by a treaty between South Africa and Swaziland, as a 
means of putting pressure on the municipal and provincial authorities to bring 
development to their region (Thornton, 2002).  Others have clearly not accepted 
that the democratic state requires of them to become ‘ordinary citizens’ rather 
than oligarchs in their community.  Kaizer Chief Matanzima, for instance, 
insisted that those who wished to meet him in council did so as Transkei 
citizens, long after the coming of democracy and the dissolution of the Transkei 
as a homeland (Crais, 2004).  These two cases illustrate that chiefs have not 
given up the hope of maintaining some form of ‘limited sovereignty’ vis-à-vis 
the South African nation-state.  In some cases, they are not shy about expressing 
the desire for more than just limited sovereignty but are pushing for complete 
autonomy, as is the case of some of the KwaZulu-Natal chiefs in the IFP.  
Even if chiefs are not making the case for complete autonomy and cultural 
separation, there are several studies that indicate the enormous ‘informal’ power 
chiefs can command in certain communities.  Lungisile Ntsebeza and Anninka 
Claasens separately illustrate how difficult it is in rural communities for 
‘subjects’ to object to the chief and his decisions (Ntsebeza, 1999; Claasens, 
2001).  To provide a delicate example, during an interview with a long-standing 
land rights activist, now Member of Parliament for the ANC, a powerful 
committee member and globally known and respected individual, the following 
situation emerged.  This particular MP expressed the fear that upon returning 
home, the local chief, with whom the individual had several conflicts over land 
usage, land rights and gender rights, would take revenge.  In this case, the chief 
had threatened the MP by calling the individual a ‘witch’ – a not inconsiderable 
threat given that the area has seen numerous witch-hunts and killings over the 
last two decades (Niehaus, 1999).  Chiefs can wield enormous cultural and 
social power through their position as both communal leaders and spokespersons 
for the village council, consisting mainly of local elders.  Often sanctioned by 
the resident traditional healers, the chief can take a central role in both the 
physical and the psychological realms of the community – a position that even a 
modern, powerful, and politically protected individual might find difficult to 
compete with.   
Particularly women’s rights advocates express the fear that should traditional 
authorities be given limited sovereignty over ‘their communities’, women’s 
rights are likely to suffer.  Women are often regarded as minors under customary 
law and do not, in many instances, have equal status to men (Claasens, 2001). 
The debate concerning women’s rights took a sharp turn over the Communal 
Land Rights Bill in 2003.  Deep divisions opened up within the ANC over the 
issue of whether the bill ought to recognise ‘ communities’ as juridical persons  12
and whether land could be transferred to them.  Lydia Kompe-Ngwenya, one of 
our interviewees, opposed such a provision arguing that the land rights of 
individual users must be recognised in and protected by the law. On the other 
hand, Patekile Holomisa, another one of our interviewees, argued that legal title 
to communal land should be vested in the traditional authorities.  After much 
debate, the legislation passed Parliament without a satisfactory solution to the 
issue of women’s rights to land.   
On the one hand, traditional authorities were given the right to administer 
communal lands but the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 
stipulates that traditional councils must contain 30% women in an effort to 
enforce women’s rights at the local village council level.  Moreover, powers 
were vested in the minister for land affairs to override local decisions, causing, 
in turn, traditional leaders to express their concerns about the further erosion of 
their powers.  This was done in response to women’s rights groups suggesting 
that women would and could be over-ruled at the local level and needed the 
protection of the state against the patriarchal powers of the elders and chief 
(Hassim, 2005).  What should be clear is that traditional leaders have re-inserted 
themselves into the political discourse in South Africa in fundamental ways.   To 
ignore the issues that arise from this re-insertion into the body politic is to 
imperil any comprehensive analysis of South African democracy (Crais, 2002; 
Koelble and LiPuma, 2004).   I shall now turn to the two competing research 
paradigms to explain this resurgence and to examine their usefulness in the 
analysis of post-colonial democracy. 
The Procedural and Institutional View of 
Democracy: On the Incompatibility of 
Traditional Leadership and Democracy 
Guillermo O’Donnell notes that the recent wave of newly emerging democracies 
across the globe have spawned polities that must be considered ‘polyarchies’ but 
which display ‘systemic variations’ in the social reach of democratic rights 
(O’Donnell, 1993). The term ‘polyarchy’ was coined by Robert Dahl to describe 
political systems that contained a ‘procedural minimum’ of contested and 
competitive elections for office, participation of the citizenry through some form 
of collective action, and accountable rulers subject to the rule of law (Dahl, 
1971).  O’Donnell suggests a colour-coding scheme in which ‘blue regions’ are  13
those in which the state and its institutions are present, highly visible and where 
the rule of law prevails.   
Then there are ‘green areas’ where the state enjoys ‘territorial penetration’ but 
functionally is not highly visible.  Lastly, there are the ‘brown areas’ where the 
state is neither functionally nor territorially present.  In these brown areas, 
O’Donnell notes, the state’s ‘components of democratic legality, and hence, of 
publicness and citizenship, fade away at the frontiers of various regions and 
class, gender and ethnic relations” (O’Donnell, 1993: 1359-61).  Here the state 
is characterised by ‘low-intensity citizenship’.   This characterisation surely 
describes the inability of the state to reach into the rural hinterlands and reflects 
a situation prevalent across the post-colony.  Yet, it glosses over the immense 
difficulties in drawing boundaries between brown, green and blue zones as they 
exist within rather than next to each other.  There are several powerful 
anthropological studies that suggest that even in densely populated urban areas, 
the reach of the post-colonial state is mediated through a variety of associations 
(Hansen, 2001; Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; Chatterjee, 2004; Caldeira, 
2000).  The aims of these associations indicate the level to which citizens of 
post-colonial democracies have to rely upon their communities, rather than the 
state, for assistance.  These associations include recycling projects, slum dweller 
associations, women’s self-help groups, criminal gangs, savings communities, 
brick-making projects, committees dedicated to the establishment and 
maintenance of public toilets and the like (Appadurai, 2000).  To attempt to 
draw a line between a ‘blue’, ‘green’ or ‘brown’ area, even in more affluent 
suburbs of cities such as Johannesburg or Cape Town is an impossible task as 
these imagined spaces are actually inseparable and mutually constitutive.  In 
practice, the reach of the state is mediated, limited and often overwhelmed by 
community relationships. 
Several ‘new institutionalist’ writers point out that the creation of new sets of 
institutions, procedures and rules are highly political acts.  Such a process has 
taken place across the globe with the coming of democracy to large parts of the 
post-colony.  The definition of what, for instance, the structure and shape of the 
governing institutions might be is guided by the interests of the parties 
negotiating the new dispensation (Thelen, Steinmo and Longstreth, 1993).  Scott 
Mainwaring, among others, has illustrated how the design of electoral systems 
and institutions is shaped by the promotion of the various sets of interests the 
participants bring to the negotiations (Mainwaring, 1991; 1995).   William 
Munro picks up on these arguments in his analysis of the role of the electoral 
system in KwaZulu-Natal (Munro, 2001).  Munro demonstrates how traditional 
leaders in that province of South Africa, in concert with their primary political  14
ally, the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), shaped the electoral system to 
suit their own particular needs at the expense of the rights-bearing citizens of 
South Africa.  He boldly states that politicians from the IFP ‘set out 
systematically to establish blue and brown areas of democratic expansion in 
order to secure their own political advantage’ (Munro, 2001: 296).  This was 
done to ‘entrench differential citizenship rights and meanings of citizenship for 
rural and urban populations; cultural clientelism in rural areas was the price for 
democratic expansion in the urban areas’ (Munro, 2001: 296).  To Munro, the 
logic of South African political development is clearly a struggle between the 
progressive forces of modernity and those that would like to defend non-
democratic structures of power. 
Munro’s emphasis on KwaZulu-Natal neglects the fact that a very similar story 
could be recounted for several other areas of South Africa in which the IFP 
played no electoral role whatsoever.  Munro’s depiction of the IFP as the party 
of Zulu tradition, as the party of opposition to the democratic dispensation, fits 
with conventional views of South African politics.  In this view, the African 
National Congress, and particularly the figure of Nelson Mandela, are 
representative of the western ideals of a movement and fighter for universal 
human rights, democracy and freedom.  Yet, there are equally powerful 
tendencies inside the ANC that support the concept of traditional leadership as 
my opening vignette and the section on traditional leadership illustrates.  And, 
certainly, Mandela himself is on record as a supporter of village level 
democracy in which the chief plays a decisive role (Nash, 2002; Mandela, 1976; 
1996).   In his autobiography, for instance, Mandela fondly recalls the way in 
which the chief in his district made decisions after much discussion and 
negotiation and the weighing of collective sentiments.  In numerous other 
accounts, Mandela has made a case for an African version of democracy that 
takes into account traditional leadership structures and rebuilds shattered 
cultural pride by restoring some of Africa’s most important cultural values, such 
as expressed in the term ‘ubuntu’ or humanity, to its rightful place.  One 
mechanism of doing so, in Mandela’s view, is to give pride of place to village 
level discussion and decision-making guided by the chief and his council.   
Mandela describes the proceedings at the Thembu Great Place at Mquekezeni 
from which he drew his account of the role of the democratic leader: 
‘It was democracy in its purest form.  There may have been a 
hierarchy of importance among the speakers, but everyone was heard; 
chief and subject; warrior and medicine man, shopkeeper and farmer, 
landowner and labourer.  People spoke without interuption, and the 
meetings lasted for many hours.  The foundation of self-government  15
was that all men were free to voice their opinions and were equal in 
their value as citizens’ (Mandela, 1994: 610). 
Mandela goes on to discuss the role of the regent.  The regent simply listens to 
the comments, no matter how critical they might be of his actions.  Meetings 
would go on until some form of consensus emerged from the deliberations; 
meetings had to end in unanimity, or they would not end with a decision.   As 
Mandela puts it: 
‘Democracy meant that all men were to be heard, and a decision was 
taken together as a people.  Majority rule was a foreign notion.  A 
minority was not to be crushed by a majority.  Only at the end of the 
meeting, as the sun was setting, would the regent speak.  His purpose 
was to sum up what had been said and form some consensus among 
the diverse opinions.  But no conclusion was forced on people who 
disagreed.  If no agreement could be reached, another meeting would 
be held’ (Mandela, 1994: 610).  
Munro’s reading of the ANC-IFP clash is a complete misreading of the debate 
around traditional leadership structures as it derives from the conventional view 
that most political scientists take when they approach ‘democracies of others’.  
On the ‘right’ side of the struggle are the champions of democracy, freedom and 
western modernity; on the other side, the champions of tradition, of anti-western 
modernity, and authoritarian rule.  This characterisation is incorrect and 
simplistic. Not only is there sympathy for the institution of traditional leadership 
in the ruling party at the very highest echelons of decision-making, but a 
conscious effort is underway to integrate and re-articulate traditional leadership 
in a modernist fashion.  That such a project is not without its critics should be 
clear; but it is not a project fostered only by the opponents of the new 
dispensation but by its very champions. 
Munro employs a wider vision of democracy than most institutional and 
procedural analysts of democracy do.  For him, the aim of a new democratic 
dispensation is not only the creation of institutions and rules, but also to develop 
‘social practices’ in which civil society can define their interests and articulate 
them in and through a ‘rich fabric of institutions and authorities’ (O’Donnell, 
1988).  However, his analysis of the impact of electoral rules is myopic as it 
brackets out the possibility that there are forces inside the ANC that might 
harbour sympathies for the traditional leadership project.  Moreover, he does not  16
entertain the notion that there are aspects of traditional leadership, which may, in 
fact, represent a different form of democratic interaction from the western 
model.  He suggests that it is in the interests of those political forces associated 
with the ‘ancien regime’ to limit the introduction of democratic institutions and 
social practices as they undermine their bases of authority and therefore power.  
And, in that sense, the IFP and the ANC stand at opposite ends in both Munro’s 
and the western imagination of the negotiation process that took place in South 
Africa concerning the new dispensation.  Yet, the data Munro ignores points to 
much greater complexity than the straightforward contrast between forces of 
progress organised in the ANC and those that stand in its way, such as the IFP.    
Munro wishes to distinguish between ‘high’ politics and ‘deep’ politics.  At the 
‘high’ end of politics stands the process of negotiation between the various 
parties and interest groups. Here the IFP, symbolised by its leader Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi, called for a federal system of governance and executive power-
sharing that would protect group rights in terms of ethnicity, language, tradition, 
and culture.  Here, the IFP could draw upon domestic allies in terms of the 
white, soon-to-be opposition parties, and the business community (both 
domestic and international) who thought that a federal system would defuse any 
centralist tendencies the ANC might still harbour.  Again, Munro’s analysis 
completely ignores the existence of pro-federalist sentiments within the ANC 
that were fostered quite systematically by external influences.  Social 
democratic allies from across Europe suggested to the ANC that a federal 
system might be a compromise that would stand the party in good stead.  Legal 
and constitutional scholars from around the globe weighed into the debate to 
illustrate the advantages of such a system (Spitz and Chaskalson, 2000; Klug, 
2000).  Federalism was adopted in South Africa, not because the IFP boycotted 
the constitutional negotiations, but because the ANC leadership had become 
convinced that such a system would not stand in the way of the social and 
economic transformations it envisaged as necessary. 
At the 'deep' end of politics, so Munro argues, the IFP “intensified its efforts to 
bolster the power and authority of rural chiefs” (Munro, 2001: 301).  It 
characterised the chiefs as the ‘core of the Zulu nation’ and a culture of 
‘parallelism’ encompassing “the best of Africa living side by side with the best 
of the West”, as Buthelezi liked to put his case in many a speech (Munro, 2001: 
301).   Unfortunately, according to Munro, the efforts of the IFP had less to do 
with ‘parallelism’ and much to do with the disenfranchisement of a large swath 
of the rural population.   What the electoral system in KwaZulu-Natal achieved 
was that the IFP chief – a non-elected one at that - remained the most direct 
representative of the rural population at the council level.  What the new  17
dispensation has achieved in rural KwaZulu-Natal is the curtailment of the rural 
population’s ability to achieve civic, social and political rights.  Munro 
concludes: 
‘In effect, the local electoral system sharply delimits rural citizen’s 
capacity to press for extended citizenship rights by constraining their 
associational autonomy in all three categories of citizenship rights.  It 
offers them limited electoral rights that strengthen the party over the 
people; it subjects occupants of tribal lands to regulation by traditional 
authorities whose arbitrary powers challenge the rule of law; and it 
undermines the ability of rural communities to press for greater 
welfare provision. In short, the institutional structure promotes a kind 
of cultural clientelism’ (Munro, 2001: 307).        
The analysis completely ignores the fact that the electoral system of KwaZulu-
Natal does not differ from any other part of the country.  In other words, the 
ANC could have harboured similar sentiments, only the analysis provided by 
Munro suggests otherwise. 
Munro ends his analysis with a consideration of how this situation might chance 
for the better.  He speculates that there are avenues in which rural citizens can 
press for their citizenship rights, but he also points to the difficulties of doing so.  
His analysis is quite pessimistic about the prospects of South African, and by 
extension other post-colonial environments where rural populations have been 
similarly limited in their access to citizenship rights.  In his view, and here he 
overlaps with the mainstream literature on democratic consolidation and 
transformation, the democratic experiment in South Africa is a truncated one 
and partial at best.  At worst, the existence of traditional leadership structures 
could preface a slide back into authoritarian and dictatorial models of 
governance.  And in that sense, Munro echoes the concerns of the entire 
procedural and institutional school when they present their assessments of 
democracy’s prospects in large parts of the post-colony.  The analysis pre-
supposes a linear model of progress towards a western society as well as politics 
and economic development. 
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The ‘Scientific’ Study of Democracy: the 
Comparative and Statistical Methods 
Painting on a much broader canvas but with a similar definition of democracy in 
mind, Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi 
(2000) provide an assessment of the impact of regime type on economic 
performance.  Using data drawn from over 140 countries, they suggest that there 
is a direct causal relationship between economic performance and democratic 
regimes.   Democratic transformations can occur in all countries, but those that 
are economically better off are more likely to maintain democracy, whereas the 
poorer countries are more likely to abandon elections as a means of choosing 
governments.  Countries that sustain electoral regimes are then, in turn, more 
likely to generate economic growth and as they generate wealth, they are more 
likely to retain democratic structures.  Wealth helps to bring about a virtuous 
cycle in which greater wealth brings benefits to the nation and therefore 
stabilises the democratic experiment.  Poverty, on the other hand, is likely to re-
affirm authoritarian and other non-democratic structures and is conducive to 
dictatorship. 
As in much of his previous work, Przeworski and his co-authors rely upon a 
‘minimalist’ definition of democracy based on Schumpeter’s notion that 
democracy is about choice and about an electoral marketplace (Przeworski et 
al., 2000: 14).  Robert Dahl’s original summation, derived from Schumpeter’s 
conceptualisation, defined procedural democracy by focusing on the competition 
for and contestation of decision-making positions and government offices, and 
the participation and inclusion of all the citizenry who had reached their 
majority (Dahl, 1971).  On this account, democracy exists when there are free 
and fair elections among competitive parties under conditions of political 
liberties, particularly freedoms of the mass media, expression and assembly.   
Methodologically, these attributes are then organised vertically into levels of 
abstraction, following the rules of formal logic.  As Munck and Vermeulen 
(2002) observe: “attributes at the same level of abstraction should tap into 
mutually exclusive aspects of the attribute at the immediately superior level of 
abstraction; otherwise the analysis falls prey to the logical problem of 
redundancy” (2002: 13).  This then allows for the transcultural and 
transhistorical equivalence of cross system measures and indicators of 
democratic governance, the leading and first example of which was presented by 
Przeworski himself in his classic analysis with Teune (Przeworski and Teune, 
1970).      19
This minimalism is conducive to large-scale comparative work and a pre-
requisite for any kind of statistical analysis.  As Arend Lijphart argued, the 
comparative method which focuses on a few cases is always suspect of having 
too few cases and too many explanatory variables.  So, in order to reduce, even 
eliminate, this short-coming, it is always better, according to Lijphart and most 
other theorists of democracy, to use the statistical approach to discover general 
rules and patterns about regimes.  In that sense, the minimalism adopted opens 
up the possibility of doing large n studies, but there are equally important short-
comings to such a truncated view of what democracy is.   The minimalist view 
brackets out of its account complicating factors, including the central issues of 
accountability, of political participation, of the international economy, the state 
of the state, its history and development, and of everyday politics in which all of 
these concepts are given meaning and substance.   No doubt, Przeworski, Dahl, 
or Lijphart recognise that ‘everyday political action’ or democratic participation 
or the international economy or the trajectory of the state might be important 
aspects of political life.  The decision to focus exclusively on procedures and 
institutions is based upon the belief that, in the interest of a solid scientific study 
of democracy, such factors are not essential.  Studies of elections and 
institutions allow for the measurement of democracy by identifying rules, 
procedures, and institutions and making them quantifiable.  However, the 
decision to overlook these aspects of democracy begs the question whether it is 
in fact acceptable to use the same criteria of comparison for the older, 
established democracies and for the newer post-colonial ones. 
Przeworski and his co-authors do not, in any way, address the issue of 
traditional leadership structures in newly emerging democracies.  However, their 
analysis could be used to analyse the re-emergence of traditional leadership 
structures in post-colonial democracies.   The authors would agree that there is a 
fundamental incompatibility between the notion of elected representation and 
the notion of hereditary leadership.  The appointment to political office must be, 
in this version of democratic theory, regulated through the electoral process, 
otherwise the basic principles of democratic accountability and representation 
are violated.  In other words, there is a basic incompatibility between the claims 
by traditional leaders that they represent their communities by virtue of their 
inherited role in the community and modern democratic principles and practices.  
Moreover, their finding that poorer countries are more likely to slip back to 
some form of dictatorship is relevant in this context as the resurgence of 
traditional leadership structures appears to be taking place in the poorest of the 
regions and provinces of South Africa.    20
Their analysis might even suggest a bifurcation of the South African national 
space into two distinct spheres.  First, a sphere of democratic institutions and 
actions (elections) in the more affluent, progressive and urban spaces and 
second, a less democratic sphere where traditional leaders and other non-elected 
power-holders operate.   The existence of such structures would signal a 
warning that the South African democratic state is still not consolidated 
sufficiently and that a return to dictatorship is still a possibility.  And, in this 
sense, the analysis of Przeworski et al, Munro and O’Donnell easily melt into 
one.  They all presuppose a linear progressivity from dictatorship to democracy, 
from tradition to modernity.  There is no room in this model for the actual 
condition of the post-colony, namely hybridity. 
Words and Politics: the Meaning of Democracy 
in the Post-Colony 
As I have tried to illustrate, the meaning of the word ‘democracy’ in the above 
school of thought relates to the study of institutions and rules, of participation 
and contestation for office, of contested elections and the system that enables 
nation-states to hold fair and free elections. As Lisa Wedeen argues, this 
reduction is committed in order to facilitate the ‘scientific study’ of democracy 
and to establish scientific, statistical results (Wedeen, 2004).  In contrast, there 
are those who will argue that democracy is more than elections, institutions and 
rules; there are those who, for instance, argue that democracy is also about 
‘social practices’’ and pre-dispositions to accept argumentation, disputes and 
their resolution.  And then there are those who would argue that democracy is 
really more about the role of civil society and its ability to converse, to 
communicate, to reform social structures and habits (Habermas, 1989; Young, 
2000).  That democracy has a substantive aspect in terms of a variety of political 
goals such as equality, social justice, or equal opportunity.  The arguments 
between those who view democracy in a narrow and technical sense and those 
who view it in a much wider, emancipatory and liberationist sense are well 
rehearsed and known (Shapiro, 1996; Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon, 1999 (a)(b)).  
This is not the space to repeat them.  I will begin, instead, with a consideration 
of the meaning of democracy in a post-colonial state structure, a structure which 
is subject to external controls over its economy and a history that turns the 
evolution of the democratic state in EuroAmerica on its head.    21
When T. H. Marshall argued that the history of citizenship moved from the 
establishment of civic rights to political rights to social rights, he was both right 
and wrong (Marshall, 1949).  He was right in capturing the chronology of the 
western state in which the provision of civic rights predated the extension of the 
franchise and then the creation of a social welfare state.  He committed a 
category error, however, in his depiction of social rights as the highest form of 
citizenship rights.  On the contrary, social rights became the means by which the 
democratic state based on equal citizenship rights could begin to discriminate 
between various ‘population groups’, between various sets of citizens.  As 
Michel Foucault points out, the major characteristic of the current democratic 
regime of power is a ‘governmentalization of the state’.  The regime gains 
legitimacy not through the participation of citizens in matters of state but 
through the claim that the state provides for the welfare of the population.   
The basis of this claim is the redistribution of resources from one group to 
another, thereby splitting up the homogeneity of the citizenry.  And this category 
error is most apparent in the formation of the colonial and post-colonial state.  
Colonial states were never based on the notion of citizenry or participating 
populations but populations to be administered.  Citizens were not recognised; 
they were subjects that were supposed to listen to commands and fulfill what 
they were told to do (Mbembe, 2000).  So, what distinguishes the colonial and 
post-colonial state from its western template is that the colonial state was 
already one of ‘governmentality’ that treated the population as groups to be 
administered rather than as rights-bearing citizens.  As Partha Chatterjee puts it: 
‘We have therefore two sets of conceptual connections.  One is the 
line connecting civil society to the nation-state founded on popular 
sovereignty and granting citizens equal rights.  The other is the line 
connecting populations to governmental agencies pursuing multiple 
policies of security and welfare.  The first line points to a domain 
described in great detail in democratic theory in the last two centuries.  
Does the other line point to a different domain of politics?  I believe it 
does.  To distinguish it from the classic associational forms of civil 
society, I am calling it political society’ (Chatterjee, 2004: 37-38).   
Chatterjee’s point, which is supported by the South African material, is that the 
development of the western state is the exact opposite of the evolution of the 
post-colonial state.  The notion of civil society, so central to the 
conceptualisation of western democracy, is both demographically and 
geographically limited.  In contrast to the efforts of the western state to bring  22
about homogeneity from diversity, to make citizens – preferably bourgeois ones 
- out of peasants, the colonial state intended to bring about heterogeneity, 
encouraged by the doctrine of ‘divide and rule’ (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991; 
1997).  Even today, in the post-colony, large parts of the population are not 
rights-bearing citizens in the way they are envisaged in the western model of the 
democratic state (Mamdani, 1996).  They are not part of civil society in the 
western sense of associations and the interaction between rights-bearing citizens 
and the state.  Nor are they outside of the realm of politics or the reach of the 
state.  Civil society, in places like India or South Africa, is restricted to a small 
section of the population that represents the ‘high ground of modernity’, as does 
the constitutional state (Chatterjee, 2004).  But, in order to maintain its 
legitimacy, the state authorities have to confront a political society in which a 
myriad and ever-shifting set of groups can be mobilised for a vast variety of 
causes.   
In South Africa, there are over 100,000 such organisations and groups ranging 
from slum dwellers associations, traditional healers and herbalists, HIV/AIDS 
sufferers, landless people’s movements, self-help organisations for the 
unemployed and many more (Robins, 2003; 2004; Habib, 2003).  Although in 
much of the literature on civil society (see, for instance, Cohen and Arato, 
1992), these organisations are characterised as comprising ‘civil society’, they 
are in fact a far cry from their western counterpart.  It is in this collision between 
a mobilised political society and the modernist project that democracy might 
actually oppose the modernist project and bring into conflict the western notions 
of modern governance and the indigenous notions of what democracy ought to 
be about.  For instance, in the case of fundamentalist Islamic groups forming 
political parties and wining political control over certain regions (as has 
happened in Nigeria) or even countries (the Sudan, Turkey, or Iran) and 
establishing Sharia laws.  Militant Hindu political movement emerged in India 
to capture regional governments and heaved the Bharatiya Janata Party into 
national power (Hanson, 1999).  In both cases, decidedly anti-western 
movements profit from democracy to establish legal and cultural systems that do 
not coincide with the western universalism of human rights and democratic 
equality.   Yet, such movements will defend democracy as a political system as 
it has brought them to power and will question western interference as a form of 
imperialism.  In other words, democracy and its use is contested terrain – it is 
not merely a static system of representation, elections, institutions and practices 
it is the ever-shifting enunciation of demands on the state made by a deprived 
citizenry struggling to survive.  23
My point here is that the ‘word’ democracy means quite different things to 
different groups of people, partially because of the history of the post-colony 
and partially because of the nature of post-colonial society.  Moreover, the 
impact of the global conversation on what constitutes ‘good democracy’ or good 
governance plays out in the local discussion of what a good governmental 
system might look like.  The consensus on the constitution, widely regarded as 
one of the most progressive and well-crafted constitutions globally, speaks to the 
cosmopolitan understanding of what democracy ought to be among South 
Africa’s political elite (Klug, 2000).  This political elite understands that the 
creation of institutions is at the heart of the western understanding of what it 
means to introduce democracy.   
Many citizens of South Africa, however, associate democracy with the abolition 
of inequalities, of greater access to resources, to equal opportunities, to decent 
housing, health care facilities and other services from which the majority of 
citizens had been deprived of (Mattes and Thiel, 1997).  Of course, democracy 
may also mean a set of institution, but the majority of black South African 
citizens associates democracy with a change in their material conditions of life.   
And, who can blame them for holding these ideals a little more dearly than a set 
of western institutions and practices?  After all, the democratic ‘revolution’ 
promised – above all – two changes.  One was the introduction of a set of 
institutions that would replace those created under colonialism and apartheid 
designed to discriminate against the majority and second the introduction of 
policy to challenge the legacies of that past.   
The South African material illustrates the interaction between a global dialogue 
as to what constitutes a good democratic regime and local conceptions of what a 
democracy should be.  The South African constitution encapsulates these 
different tendencies (Klug, 2000).  The document contains commitments to a set 
of institutions and practices based upon both European and US notions of the 
ideal democracy (checks and balances, the notion of power-sharing, judicial 
review, federalism, proportional representation).  It also outlines a commitment 
to a broad range of social, political, and environmental rights (Spitz and 
Chaskalson, 2000).  Yet, the implementation of such rights is proving to be 
much more difficult than the setting up of a set of institutions as the economy 
struggles to provide the resources necessary for any fundamental shift in social, 
cultural and economic power.  The experience of the last ten years of democracy 
has been that the introduction of institutions reflecting the international 
consensus on what good democracy might be was the easy part.  That was 
accomplished with the acceptance of the constitution and the adaptation of the 
political and administrative system.    24
What has been far more difficult to accomplish is the abolition of structural 
poverty, unemployment, lack of skills, ill health and deprivation (Daniel, Habib, 
and Southall, 2003).  And it is in these arenas of policy that the vast majority of 
South Africans expect, at some point, to see advances.  The striking indication 
one gleans from the public opinion data is the immense amount of patience 
Africans are willing to extend to their political elite recognising that the 
economic and political reforms undertaken will take time to bear fruit 
(Afrobarometer, 2004).  Moreover, there is a sophisticated recognition of the 
nature of the economic and political problems facing country and continent. It 
would appear that African voters are, in some cases, willing to extend a much 
longer period of time to their chosen governments than European or US voters 
are.  This fact, in itself, speaks to a different sense of temporality among African 
voters.  How long this remarkable patience will last is one of the imponderables 
of the democratisation project across the continent. 
The second analytical point of the argument in this section was that democracy 
in South Africa is bound to take a different course from those in Europe or 
North America.  The experience of the majority of the population with the state 
is fundamentally different from that of the EuroAmerican trajectory.  In the 
post-colony, the state functioned on the basis of ‘divide and rule’, it did not 
create a sense of citizenship, belonging, trust or national community but indeed 
the opposite.   There is only an embryonic ‘civil society’ that is busily 
mobilising a political society in all sorts of ways to participate in the struggle for 
scarce resources in an environment of joblessness, shrinking labor demand and 
low skills.  As internal conditions for the consolidation of democracy are 
fundamentally different, so are the external conditions. The coming of post-
colonial democracy coincides with attempts to bring about sentiment of 
solidarity, citizenship and national community that is absolutely necessary for 
the success of a democratic nation-building exercise.  Yet, these efforts take 
place in a context in which the forces of international finance and capital are 
conspiring to undermine the economic sovereignty of the national state and 
especially its ability to establish control over its resources.  Moreover, the 
population frequently experiences the coming of democracy not as liberation, as 
promised, but as continued poverty and displacement even if there are some 
attempts to bring about an improved quality of life on behalf of some 
governments.   The inability of the state to bring about meaningful change in the 
everyday lives of their citizens is associated with the continuation of previous 
conditions and is often blamed on the minorities and social groups that had 
benefited from the previous regime (Chua, 2003).    25
Democracy and the Politics of Traditional 
Leadership 
During an intensive three-hour interview with several of the most influential 
traditional leaders at the House of Traditional Leaders in Bisho, Eastern Cape, 
the following exchange occurred.  One of the traditional leaders, armed with a 
law degree from the University of the Transkei and, reputedly, a post-graduate 
degree from a prestigious British university, expounded on the democratic 
model that underlies the system of governance advocated by the traditional 
leaders in the Eastern Cape.  His views illustrated vividly the type of thinking 
that appears to inspire the defense of traditional leadership for a large cohort of 
traditional leaders and spans across the political divide as we heard IFP and 
ANC-affiliated traditional leaders make similar kinds of arguments.  The 
position is essentially that village democracy and traditional leadership is about 
involving the community in decision-making and that this kgotla system of 
consultation represents an African version of direct democracy. 
In response to the Draft White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance 
issued by the Minister for Provincial and Local Government on October 29
th, 
2002, the Eastern Cape traditional leaders had written an extensive comment.  
This comment took issue with a whole range of matters pertaining to the White 
Paper concerning the role of traditional leaders in South African society, their 
function under colonial and apartheid rule, and their prospective place in local 
governance matters.  This comment argues that there are several meanings to the 
term democracy and that representative democracy, as adopted by the 
constitution and the government, could be substituted by a better form of 
democracy – namely direct democracy.  The Comment on the Draft White Paper 
reads as follows: 
‘The White Paper makes the consistent assumption that democracy 
has only one meaning, namely, that of representative democracy, in 
which people vote for representatives who then decide on all matters.  
However, direct democracy is a major alternative system, which was 
adopted most successfully in Switzerland.  One of the main features of 
direct democracy is that the people decide on issues and can challenge 
any decision on any issue that is made by their elected governments.  
The traditional system of democracy is therefore similar to that 
practiced originally in Switzerland, before the introduction of the 
referendum, where decisions were made by the people gathered in the 
village square.  The African tribal tradition requires decisions to be  26
made on a consensus basis by the people with the traditional leader 
acting as the facilitator of the discussions.  The assumption made in 
the White Paper that traditional community decision-making 
processes are undemocratic and therefore unconstitutional is incorrect.  
This is a vitally important factor in the issue regarding governance of 
traditional communities’ (The Coalition of Traditional Leaders, 2002: 
4).  
Obviously informed about the political science literature and the controversies 
surrounding the concept of consociational democracy, this particular traditional 
leader began to refer to Arend Lijphart’s work and suggested that Lijphart’s 
ideas concerning consociational democracy were in accordance with the 
traditional system of village decision-making in Africa.  All the traditional 
leaders desired to do was, according to this spokesperson, to return to a system 
of consensus-building in their communities that echoed the politics of the pre-
colonial period.   
One possible response to such a characterisation is that Lijphart’s work is being 
‘misused’.  One might recall that the South African National Party developed 
the theme of consociational democracy when it unveiled its 1983 Constitution.  
The constitution called into existence three Houses of Parliament, one for 
whites, another for coloreds, and the third for Indians on the basis that this 
trifurcated system corresponded to the demands for representation for each of 
the South African major racial groups.  The Nationalists argued that the system 
was in accordance with Lijphart’s notions of consociationalism and attempted to 
market the system as a concession to liberal democracy in the West European 
sense. Never mind, of course, that the system also shifted power from the 
legislature to the executive and gave the President unprecedented decision-
making powers.  Moreover, the continued political exclusion of the country’s 
black population was, of course, justified on the basis of their citizenship in the 
Bantustans.  Since the Bantustans had their own administrative and 
representative structures – based on traditional leadership – the black majority 
would not require representation in the South African system of governance. 
Yet, the interpretation of the traditional leaders of the concept of consociational 
democracy illustrates that western conceptions of political forms undergo a 
transformation when they travel across the globe to the post-colony and where 
they may acquire quite unpredictable/unlikely meanings. While there may be 
some superficial likeness between the cantonal system of village decision-
making in Switzerland and the kgotla system of village consultation in wide  27
parts of Southern Africa, the differences are as striking as the similarities.   The 
traditional leaders in Bisho are looking for a western justification for the system 
of governance that suits their interests and practices best and they appear to have 
found just such a justification in the democratic rhetoric of the Swiss cantonal 
system of deliberation.  Without a great deal of knowledge about how that 
particular system (or rather systems) may have operated, its imaginary form – 
local-level, direct, participatory, consensus-based democracy – is taken as its 
essence and is then used to provide African village-level decision-making a 
western form or counterpart.  It also serves as a welcome respite from charges 
that African politics is patriarchal and autocratic as the traditional leaders are at 
pains to point out that women are included in the deliberations and that 
decisions are taken not by the chief but by the community in consensus.  In that 
sense, the rhetoric of participatory and direct democracy, of consensus-seeking 
democracy, exercised by the chiefs has both a local and a global moment. 
Similarly, Lijphart’s work clearly has global pretensions while being rooted in a 
local, western European discourse of democratic practice.  Lijphart argues that 
consensus-oriented democratic systems are an alternative to the civil conflict 
plaguing much of the post-colony and many places besides.  Consensus 
democracy, however imperfect it may appear to be from the point of view of 
participatory democracy, is better than no democracy at all.  In comparison to 
the Westminster system of adversarial democracy, Lijphart insists, the 
consensus system is far better suited to the conditions of plural societies in 
which there is more potential for conflict between ethnic, religious, racial, 
linguistic, or interest groups.  Irrespective of whether his position or that of his 
critics is correct or not, the fact is that the theory of consensus-seeking 
democracy is designed for global consumption. It sets out a blue-print for local 
democracy under the difficult conditions of plural societies prone to civil 
conflict across the globe.  So, did the South African National Party or the 
traditional leaders get him wrong?  Did they simply misunderstand the issues as 
Lijphart poses them and the solutions he offers them? 
The answer to this question is both a yes and a no.  Surely the argument Lijphart 
wishes to make regarding the Swiss system is one that stresses the participation 
of every individual citizen on the basis of equal political right (unlike the Swiss 
cantonal system prior to the introduction of the referendum that excluded 
women completely).  He also places emphasis on the representative nature of the 
system in the sense that power-sharing takes place between the various political 
parties at the executive and legislative levels.  His system of consociation is, 
above all, a system of representative democracy, not direct citizen-level 
participation.  In fact, many aspects of the consensus system are in direct  28
contrast to ideas of direct democracy as the system’s success depends on elite 
bargaining and reaching compromise decisions after negotiation and a great deal 
of log-rolling rather than some negotiated consensus among the citizenry. Both 
the original consociational and consensus-oriented democracies are both elitist 
systems rather than grassroots based political systems.  So, at the level of 
‘understanding’ Lijphart’s model, there are several areas where the 
understanding of the National Party or the understanding of the traditional 
leaders in Bisho differs markedly from the intentions – both stated and unstated 
– in Lijphart’s texts. 
Yet, at another level, while there may be a misreading of Lijphart’s intentions, 
there is, of course, an act of (re)interpretation unfolding that needs to be taken 
seriously.  The fact is that much of the western discourse on democratic systems 
has no theory of reception, no notion of how what is written may be interpreted 
in rather different ways as the underlying ontology may differ fundamentally 
from that of the western academic.  In the case of the apartheid regime, surely 
there may have been an act of ‘conscious’ mis-recognition of Lijphart’s notions 
as there is a measure of conscious mis-recognition on part of the traditional 
leaders.  The apartheid regime, just as contemporary traditional leaders, used the 
categories of Lijphart’s work with a certain measure of tongue-in-cheek.  But at 
another level their interpretation of the work on consensus democracy reflects 
the collision of local with global pretensions and the mixing of global 
democratic blue-prints with local prerogatives.  
To provide a telling comparison, consider the court case brought by Julia 
Martinez against the Pueblo tribe for unequal treatment that Amy Gutmann 
refers to in her discussion of the relationship between democracy and identity.  
In this case, the Pueblo Indian community discriminated against the children of 
Pueblo women who had married outside of the tribe (in this case Martinez had 
married a Navajo) but not against the children of Pueblo men who had married 
outside of the tribe.  The Pueblo community argued that deference to the group 
meant that the group could discriminate as to who had access to the resources of 
the tribe (land, hunting, fishing) and the right of residence, the vote in 
community affairs, and other rights accruing only to Pueblo Indians.  The 
Supreme Court of the US found that the tribe indeed had ‘limited sovereignty’ 
over such matters and dismissed Martinez’s case in 1968.   
Gutmann interprets the Supreme Court decision as an unqualified disaster for 
women’s rights in the US.  Her view of the judicial decision is that it provides a 
traditional community with immunity to disregard the rights of the individual  29
person.  She does not mince her words – to her the decision to grant limited 
sovereignty is a triumph of collective over individual rights and represents 
tyranny, not democracy.  ‘Limited sovereignty’, to Gutmann, opens the doors to 
patriarchalism, to dictatorial methods and the deprivation of human rights and 
dignity, even in the US.  In this manner, the proceduralist and institutionalist 
view of Przeworski et al is mirrored and echoed by a political theorist who 
worries about substantive democracy and would otherwise reject the minimalist 
notion of democracy advocated by academics such as Przeworski.  To Gutmann, 
the Supreme Court ruling represents a travesty of justice in the heartland of 
progressivity and modernity. 
To a theorist from the post-colony, however, the cultural, historical and 
structural roots of the concept of ‘limited sovereignty’, even in the US, are all 
too familiar.  From a post-colonial perspective, the establishment of the ‘Native 
Indian Reservation’ is nothing other than the establishment of Bantustans or 
homelands under the apartheid regime and the colonial strategy of isolating 
‘surplus people’ in areas and regions of little use to the capitalist economy and 
of maximum political neglect.  Brutalised communities of people were moved 
onto such reservations, with no regard for their origins, cultural traditions, or 
similarities and differences.  The general history of subjugation of Native 
Americans differs little from those of other conquered or colonised peoples, with 
the possible exception that Native Americans had the misfortune of claiming 
land that now belongs to the sole superpower and are unlikely to win their 
campaign for restitution.  However, when Gutmann claims that Pueblo society is 
‘traditional’, she is committing an important factual and analytical error.  Pueblo 
Indian society in 1968 is thoroughly modern; thoroughly hybrid; thoroughly 
enmeshed in and structured by the encounter with EuroAmerican modernity.  In 
short, there is nothing traditional about the hierarchical structures Julia Martinez 
struggled against in her Supreme Court bid.  Modern Pueblo society is a product 
of the encounter with EuroAmerican modernity and the structure imposed upon 
it by that encounter.  It is not the product of a development willed by the Pueblo 
themselves, although it might be perpetuated by those who profit from its new 
set of rules.  Similarly, the idea of establishing a kingdom of custom in South 
Africa is not a return to traditional, pre-colonial regimes.  This form of 
governance has little to do with the past and much to do with present attempts to 
reshape the image of democracy into the vernacular. 
There are several sites of struggle in the reconstitution of traditional leadership 
in South Africa.  At one level, a group of hereditary leaders are attempting to 
modernise an institution that has roots in the pre-colonial period.  In order to 
become the spokespeople for an, as yet, non-existent class of people, the rural  30
population of South Africa, these traditional leaders are busy ‘democratising’ 
their institution to make it compatible with the requirements of a modern, 
western democracy.  In order to do so, they are drawing upon the legislation 
passed by the government to fulfill democratic norms and practices such as 
having women chiefs, female quotas in village councils, youth representatives in 
village deliberations and women elected into local councils.  And in some 
regions of the country, such efforts at ‘modernisation’ of the institution are taken 
not only seriously but have brought about a very different form of traditional 
leadership.  Certainly, Mandela’s vision of the consensus-seeking chief is one 
that could be turned into reality if there is sufficient oversight to ensure 
democratic accountability and transparency. 
At another level, the capacity of the state to affect change in the rural areas, 
particularly the Bantustans of old, is limited.  Some observers go as far as to say 
that in the Transkei ‘no institution has stepped in to replace traditional leaders’, 
characterizing the situation as one of ‘ungovernance’ (Crais, 2004: 19).  The 
Transkei is by no means the only region of South Africa that must be 
characterised in such a manner.  What government legislation in terms of the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act and the Communal 
Land Rights Act achieves is a reconstitution of culture and history that views the 
pre-colonial period as one of bounded absolute monarchies or previous 
sovereign states that lost their independence due to colonialism.    It is a short 
step from such a historical and cultural melange of mis-representation to the 
admission that traditional leadership has an important role to play in the future 
political and cultural life of South Africa.  While certain traditional leaders 
claim that their powers are being undermined by the legislation, the fact is that 
the legislation provides them with much greater powers than the original 
constitution and that it allows their direct involvement in political, 
administrative and developmental matters.  In that sense, there must be a 
concern that clientelistic structures are being constructed that seriously question 
the democratic nature and accountability of rural local governance. 
In other words, the door is wide open for several, quite contradictory 
developments to occur.  On the one hand, it is entirely possible that an African 
version of local level democracy in which deliberations and consensus-building 
represents the central core of values develops.  There are certainly forms of local 
level democracy in parts of Africa that replicate deliberative democracy and are 
in the best tradition of democratic justice.  On the other, it is also a possibility 
that traditional leaders take the opportunity to establish what Gutmann refers to 
as ‘limited sovereignty tyranny’.  The former outcome is possible only if the 
state takes responsibility for the oversight of local level institutions, allowing for  31
channels of complaint and adjudication.  The later is probable if the state 
neglects its role and adopts the view that ‘limited sovereignty’ is a right not a 
privilege and thereby adopts practices not unlike those of its colonial and 
apartheid predecessors.  Currently, the neo-liberal framework dictated to the 
post-colony in general points to the later outcome as being the more likely.  It is 
also possible that several arrangements between these two polar opposites 
emerge.   
Whatever the case might be, there is no doubt that in each case, its proponents 
will describe the situation as a form of ‘democracy’ and its critics will charge 
that it is not.  In some cases, the critics may well be correct; in others they will 
not.  Whatever the case might end up being, there should not be any doubt that 
the situation represents a hybrid between a variety of versions of modernity and 
tradition.  These hybrids will vary according to the impact of the global 
economy and the shock-waves it sends through the culture of the locality.  Add 
to this brew the impact of a colonial/apartheid history, characterised by extreme 
brutalisation, and the discourses of the present about appropriate forms of 
governance and behavior. The resulting mix is a cacophony of sounds and 
colors, diverse as the rainbow nation it supposedly represents, and united only 
by the space it occupies.   32
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